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CONVERSATIONS  WITH GREAT ECONOMISTS 
 
ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMIC POLICIES IN 
PERIODS OF HIGH TURBULENCE 
 
 
Robert H. Bates    Diego Pizano 







In the 1970’s there was a serious crisis in the world economy and a deep dissatisfaction 
with the state of economic theory. Between 1976 and 1979 Colombian economist Diego 
Pizano conducted a series of structured dialogues with some of the greatest economists of 
the second half of the 20th century, with the aim of discussing this situation. His project 
was supported from the outset by Professor Paul A. Samuelson from MIT. The result was a 
book on contemporary economic thought, which was published in spanish by the Fondo de 
Cultura Económica of México in 1980. 
 
In 2009 the english version of this book was published in New York (Jorge Pinto books). In 
December 18
th, 2009, The Brookings Institution of Washington DC decided to organize the 
launch of this book, because they thought it helps to understand the current crisis and is 
useful in rethinking economic theories and policies. This document brings together the 

















CONVERSACIONES CON GRANDES ECONOMISTAS 
 
TEORÍA ECONÓMICA Y POLÍTICAS ECONÓMICAS 
DURANTE PERÍODOS DE ALTA TURBULENCIA 
 
Robert H. Bates    Diego Pizano 






Durante los años setenta surgieron graves crisis que afectaron la economía mundial y una 
profunda insatisfacción con el estado de la teoría económica. Con el objetivo de discutir 
esta situación, entre 1976 y 1979 el economista colombiano Diego Pizano dirigió una serie 
de diálogos estructurados con algunos de los grandes economistas de la segunda mitad del 
siglo XX. Desde el principio su proyecto contó con el apoyo del Profesor Paul A. 
Samuelson del MIT. El resultado consistió en un libro sobre pensamiento económico 
contemporáneo, publicado en español por el Fondo de Cultura Económica de México en 
1980.  
 
La versión en inglés de este libro fue publicada en Nueva York en 2009 (Jorge Pinto 
libros). El 18 de diciembre de 2009, The Brookings Institution de Washington, D. C., 
decidieron organizar el lanzamiento de este texto, pues consideraron que hace una 
contribución para la comprensión de la crisis actual y es de utilidad para repensar las teorías 
y las políticas económicas. Este documento reúne las presentaciones realizadas en dicha 
ocasión. 
 
Palabras clave: pensamiento económico, teorías económicas, políticas económicas, crisis 

















Excerpts from the book 
 
"Depressions are not the result of the operation of the market. They are the result of 
government controls, particularly in the sphere of monetary policy". Professor F.A. Hayek, 
Nobel Prize winner in Economics.  
 
"It is because I want to make economics more human that I want to make it more time 
conscious." Professor Sir John Hicks, Nobel Prize winner in Economics. 
 
 "The most important challenge facing the world economy is the need to strengthen the 
adjustment mechanism between the growth of supply and demand for primary products". 
Professor N. Kaldor, Cambridge University. 
 
 "Many people in the Soviet Union are aware that our economic system is not perfect... It is 
true that the Soviet economy's growth rate has decreased". Professor L.V. Kantorovich, 
Nobel Prize Winner in Economics.  
 
"The unemployment of developing economies arises because productive capacity and 
effective demand have never been at an appropriate level". Professor J. Robinson, 
University of Cambridge. 
 
 "Schumpeter was wrong when he thought there is a timetable for the disappearance of 
capitalism". Professor P. Samuelson, Nobel Prize winner in Economics.  
 
"I am not as optimistic as Keynes in the sense the economic problem will disappear as a 
result of compound interest and technical progress." Professor J. Tinbergen, Nobel Prize 
Winner in Economics.  
  
Some comments about the book 
 
"A useful and important book". Professor P. Samuelson, MIT, Nobel Prize winner in 
economics.  
 
"A lively addition to the economics literature". Professor A. Hirschman, Institute for 
Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
 "You will have read, studied or taught the work of these outstanding economists. Now you 
get a chance to meet them. Through the work of Diego Pizano we learn about how they 
thought and not just what they thought". Professor R. Bates, Harvard University.  
 
"Through penetrating and well structured questions, Colombian economist Diego Pizano 
manages to reveal the thought processes of five of the first Nobel Prize winners in Economics 
and two who could have obtained it, Joan Robinson and N. Kaldor. This book has to be read 
by all researchers interested in the history of economic thought and by all persons interested 
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I.  Foreword 
 
The recent slowdown of the world economy, considered as the worst recession since the 
1930's, has led to a rethinking of economic theories and policies. In this context, the Latin 
America Initiative at Brookings decided to organize the launch of the English version of the 
book, Conversations with Great Economists, prepared by Diego Pizano. 
  
His book consists of structured dialogues with some of the most distinguished economists 
of the second half of the XX century, five of whom received the Nobel Prize. The other two 
are considered as the leading Keynesian economists of the 20th century. These great 
thinkers reacted to the crisis the world experienced in the 1970's and made very relevant 
observations on how to improve theories and policies. 
  
The book was presented at Brookings on December 17th, 2009 by Professor Robert Bates 
(Harvard) and Professor Darrell Hueth (Maryland). Additional remarks were made by 
Mauricio Carrizosa (World Bank). I wish to thank the author and the discussants for 
participating in this stimulating event and to the CEDE- Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá) 






Senior Fellow and Director 
Latin America Initiative 
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II. Conversations with Great Economists 
                                                                                        
Diego Pizano 
 
First of all, I wish to thank Mauricio Cárdenas and the Brookings Institution for organizing 
this event. It is a real honor to talk at the most important economic policy think tank there is 
at the global level. Economists are considered to have a special ability to transform the 
obvious into the incomprehensible. I hope I will not succeed, since I will try to explain in a 
clear way how this book was prepared and what insights it could offer to understand the 
current economic crisis. 
 
Origin of this book 
 
Between 1972 and 1974 I was undertaking postgraduate studies in economics at Cambridge 
University in the UK. The discipline of economics was going through a difficult time and 
the international economy was experiencing many imbalances and a high degree of 
turbulence. Professor Joan Robinson (1) wrote about the ‘Second Crisis of Economic 
Theory’(1972) and Professor John Hicks (2) wrote a book on ‘The Crisis in Keynesian 
Economics’(1974). 
 
In 1973-75 we had stagflation in many countries, high oil and commodity prices and a 
slowdown of the world economy. Stock prices fell 48% in 1973-74. The UK had to 
negotiate a program of support with the IMF in 1976. 
 
Given this state of affairs, I thought at the end of 1975, that it would be useful and 
interesting to discuss some fundamental issues associated with economic theory and its 
applicability with some of the most important economists of the second half of the 20th 
century. 
 
I proposed this project to Professor Paul Samuelson at the beginning of 1976 and he 
supported the idea with enthusiasm. The other outstanding economists also accepted to 
participate. I spoke to Professor Samuelson again in 2007 and he agreed with the idea of 
preparing this edition.  
 
I want to express my gratitude to the brilliant scholars who participated in this project and 
in particular to this eminent and generous economist who died a few days ago. In October 
2009 I invited him to participate in today’s event and he replied that he supported the idea 
of presenting the book at Brookings but although he was feeling well, he had decided he 
was a bit old to travel. This truly great man was the most important economist of the 
second half of the 20th century at the world level and he certainly deserves to rest in peace. 
 
The seven wise men 
 
The conversations were conducted in English but the book was initially published in 
Spanish  by the  Fondo de Cultura Económica of Mexico (3). Several scholars like 
Professor Albert O. Hirschmann (Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton) and Professor  
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Darrell Hueth (Maryland) encouraged me to prepare the English version, which is the one 
we are presenting today. 
 
One of the main issues I discussed with these eminent economists was the need to make 
economics more relevant by accepting we live in a non-ergodic world with a high degree of 
uncertainty. I suggested that economists need to integrate historic, institutional, legal and 
anthropological elements into their analysis. A critical examination of the foundations of 
economics was needed and that explains why we had to discuss epistemological issues. 
Some of my colleagues do not fully understand why this is a useful and indispensable 
exercise. They might understand this need better if they examine the following paragraph 
written by Professor Albert Einstein: 
  
“The reciprocal relationship of epistemology and science is of a noteworthy kind. 
They are dependent upon each other. Epistemology without contact with science 
becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is-insofar it is thinkable 
at all- primitive and muddled”(4). 
 
We now need to reexamine the foundations of economics. The contributions of these seven 
wise men offer very important insights to undertake this task. Allow me a very brief 
comment on each one of these great economists.  
 
Professor Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) 
 
He received the Nobel Prize for his pioneering work on the theory of money and economic 
fluctuations and for his analysis of the functional efficiency of different economic systems. 
He influenced the economic policies of Reagan and Thatcher and considered that the main 
task of economic theory was to explain how economic agents adapt to the unknown. He 
influenced the work of many scholars including Professor Oliver E. Williamson who got 
the Nobel Prize a few weeks ago. 
 
He admired Adam Smith and David Hume and when I entered his private library I saw that 
behind his armchair he had two nice oil paintings of these two outstanding thinkers. 
  
He emphasized the need for interdisciplinary research and considered that economics could 
not be a mathematical science like physics. He believed that “Nobody can be a great 
economist who is only an economist”. His book on the ‘Sensory Order’ is an important 
contribution in the field of cognitive science. 
 
In 1980 we invited him to give a lecture at the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá. He 
replied to me saying that he could accept if I managed to arrange a visit to the Galapagos 
Islands. He admired Darwin and he considered that the concept of evolution was important 
for understanding economic history. At that moment he had a commitment with the 
University of California and only had two days for his visit to Bogotá and the Galapagos. 
He told me that he was willing to take the night train from Bogotá to Quito. Unfortunately 
that connection that does not exist and we were not able to organize his visit with such a 




Professor Herbert Simon (Nobel Prize in Economics) wrote in 1981 that no one explained 
better how market mechanisms work  than Professor Hayek. 
 
 
Professor Sir John Hicks (1904-1989) 
 
He was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1972 for his pioneering work on general equilibrium 
theory and welfare theory. He made a great effort to introduce time into economic theory to 
“make it more human”. He was a kind and brilliant scholar who made contributions to 
micro and macroeconomics, business cycles, welfare economics, growth theory and 
economic history. He liked to think his answers very carefully and at one point in our 
conversation he asked me to give him a week to prepare a better reply to some of my 
questions. He met Keynes and exchanged several letters with him. His father-in-law was 
Sidney Webb, one of the main founders of the London School of Economics. 
 
He developed the IS-LM diagram which was very useful for explaining basic Keynesian 
macroeconomics to many students around the world; however, in our conversation I 
pointed out to him he was not including the effect of uncertainty in his analysis and in that 
sense his presentation was not complete. He accepted this criticism in a positive way, an 
attitude that not all scholars share. It was interesting to note that a few years later he wrote 
an article in which he accepted the limitations of his original scheme (5). 
 
He was aware that economic laws were not like the laws of physics: “Economists, who deal 
with the daily actions of men and the consequences of these actions, can rarely find the 
same permanence.” He considered that economic theories do not have permanent validity. 
He wrote an important book about causality and economics(6). I made some remarks on 
this book at a meeting of the World Econometric Society which took place in Bogotá in 
1984. More than 300 of the top international econometricians were present and to my 
surprise very few knew this book. I found that one of the few scholars attending this 
conference who had examined this issue thoroughly was Professor Amartya Sen, who was 
the President of the Econometric Society at that time.  
 
Professor Lord Nicholas Kaldor (1908-1986) 
 
He was one of the leading Keynesian economists of the postwar period. In 1975 he was 
elected as President of the Royal Economic Society. He made important contributions to 
the theory of growth and distribution, welfare economics, business cycle theory and to the 
understanding of disequilibrium economics. He developed the cobweb model which has 
been very useful for understanding fluctuations in commodity markets and worked out the 
so called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria for welfare comparisons. 
 
He met Professor John Von Neumann (they were both born in Budapest, Hungary) and 
exchanged views with him on the theory of growth. He did not agree with some of his 
economic writings, but he considered this famous professor as the most creative genius he 




Among his outstanding students: Professor L. Hurwicz (Nobel Prize winner), Professor J. 
Bhagwatti (leading international trade theorist) and his Excellency, M. Singh (Prime 
Minister of India). He exchanged views with some important economists working in Latin 
America like Professors Lauchlin Currie of Colombia and Celso Furtado of Brazil. 
 
He considered that well designed government interventions could accelerate growth in 
developed and developing countries. He was convinced that Keynesian economics offered 
very valuable insights to manage effectively a free enterprise system and achieve growth 
and stability. He influenced British economic policies for many years. He had intense 
debates with Professor Friedrich Hayek and with Professor Milton Friedman. 
 
  He was a tax advisor to several countries, including India, Mexico and Turkey. His 
Cambridge colleagues used to say that one of the best ways of promoting a revolution in a 
given country was to invite Professor Kaldor as a tax advisor! (in some countries strikes 
were organized when he proposed to tax consumption).  
 
 
Professor Leonid V. Kantorovich (1912-1986) 
 
A mathematical prodigy who developed the theory of linear programming, he was awarded 
the Nobel Prize for his contributions to the optimal allocation of resources. 
 
In our conversation (1979) he displayed great intellectual honesty and he accepted the 
Soviet Economy was having serious problems. However, he was convinced that the theory 
of optimal planning (which he developed) would enable his country to have a better 
performance than the free market economies of the west. He expressed admiration about 
the works of Keynes, Leontieff and Von Neumann. He considered that science and 
technology were fundamental in accelerating the growth of any economy. 
 
When I visited him in Moscow he was the Director of the Institute for the Control of the 
Soviet Economy. 
 
Professor Joan Robinson (1903-1983) 
 
Keynes regarded her as the most brilliant of his collaborators. Many economists consider 
she should have obtained the Nobel Prize. She made important contributions to several 
fields of economics including the theory of imperfect contribution, the theory of growth, 
the theory of employment, Marxian economics and economic philosophy. Her father was 
General Frederick B. Maurice, who was a controversial figure because he accused Prime 
Minister Lloyd George of misleading Great Britain during the First World War. 
 
She considered that Keynesian dynamics could be applied to developing countries. In our 
talks she made reference to her experiences in countries such as India, China and Mexico. 
Her books about China were controversial partly because she found positive aspects in 




For many years he had a controversy about the theory of capital with Professors Samuelson 
and Solow of MIT. 
 
Professor Amartya Sen (Nobel Prize) was one of her outstanding students. She believed 
economics could never be an exact science and stated that: 
“As a discipline, economics has to float between metaphysic, moral and scientific 
statements”.  
 
Professor Paul A. Samuelson (1915-2009) 
 
He had a very wide range of interests and contributions. He wrote more than 600 papers 
and was widely considered as the last great generalist in economics. 
 
He was awarded the Nobel Prize because “more than any other contemporary economist, he 
has contributed to raising the general analytical and methodological level in economic 
science”. I visited him again in October 2007 and found him reading the main economic 
journals. We had a good exchange of ideas on globalization, free trade and other issues. He 
asked me about former President Virgilio Barco of Colombia (who studied at MIT) and 
Professor Lauchlin Currie (former economic advisor to President Roosevelt, who became a 
Colombian citizen). At that time he was 92 years old and his memory and his analytical 
skills were in very good shape. 
 
He liked to say that ‘Economics is the oldest of the arts and the newest of the sciences’. He 
also insisted that ‘an efficient and humane society requires  both halves of the economist 
system-market and government’. Several of his students got the Nobel Prize in economics 
among them Professors Stiglitz, Akerlof and Krugman. 
 
Professor Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994) 
 
 He was awarded the first Nobel Prize in Economics for having developed and applied 
dynamic models for the analysis of economic processes.    
He developed the first national comprehensive macroeconomic model. He is considered as 
one of the main pioneers of econometrics; he studied US economic cycles.   
 
He had the chance to discuss physics with Albert Einstein and the foundations of 
economics with John Maynard Keynes. 
 
He supported the idea of the mixed economy and made contributions to the theory of 
optimal economic policies. His brother Nicholas also obtained a Nobel Prize (in Medicine), 
a very unusual event. When I talked with him in 1977, he was worried about nuclear war 









I am neither a freshwater economist (those purists who believe the market will solve every 
economic problem) nor a saltwater economist (who tend to believe in strong government 
intervention). Both schools have made extremely important contributions and I respect 
them. However, both schools accepted  the efficient market view of the financial sector as 
Professor Krugman (a saltwater economist) has accepted (7). Their models cannot explain 
the current crisis. 
 
I am a high altitude economist! (I live 8000 feet above sea level) who believes competitive 
and well regulated markets have a very important role to play, but I also consider that 
economists have to develop better theories and undertake much more empirical work to 
understand how the world economy works. 
 
We need to work with real and not abstract human beings. Humans tend to be emotional, 
not fully informed and often value more the present than the future. That means accepting 
uncertainty and bounded rationality. We will have to sacrifice mathematical elegance but 
we might improve explanatory power. 
 
It could be argued that the crisis was due to excessive risk taking on the part of bankers and 
Wall Street brokers and executives and to government failures in the field of regulation. 
Markets do not regulate themselves and they need to function within appropriate 
institutions. This is a point that Adam Smith accepted. He also thought that ethical and 
moral behavior was absolutely imperative and essential for a good economic system, a 
fundamental point which was dismissed by some economic agents. 
 
The crisis could also be seen as a failure of models and ideas. The distinction made by 
Professor F. Knight in the 1920’s about risk and uncertainty, later developed by Keynes, 
was forgotten. There are many uncertain events which cannot be expressed by means of 
objective probabilities. People who invested in subprime mortgages seemed to be unaware 
of this reality. Models based on perfect information and rational expectations might be 
useful as thought experiments of ideal economic systems but they cannot be used to 
formulate economic policies without major adjustments.  
 
Insights from behavioral and new institutional economics are very relevant for improving 
the relevance of economic theory. But I would like to say that I agree with The Economist 
(8) when it states that the main problems of the discipline are concentrated in the areas of 
macroeconomics and financial economics. We should not forget that globalization and open 
economies have lifted more than 300 million people out of poverty in the last 20 years. 
 
In the case of Latin America we are used to booms and busts, to market failures and 
government failures. In the last 10-15 years policies have improved but we continue to need 
consistent macroeconomic policies, dynamic entrepreneurs, productivity increases, open 
economies and better institutions (in the sense of rules of the game). We need to invest a 
great deal in human capital and infrastructure, develop better safety nets and continue to 




The ideas discussed in this book are relevant for improving theories and policies. In 
addition the works of people like Douglass North (9),  George Akerloff (10), Amartya Sen 
(11) and Robert Skydelsky (12) offer very important insights. 
 
Finally, I would like to express my thanks to Professor Robert Bates, to Professor Darrell 
Hueth and to Mr. Mauricio Carrizosa for taking the time to read the book and for preparing  
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III. Remarks by Professor Robert Bates 
 
Dr. Pizano labors simultaneously in at least three fields: public service, scholarship, and 
international commerce.  No one who has come to know his work can fail to admire the 
grace with which he spans these fields and the level of excellence he has brought to each.  
As a scholar, I have long benefited from his studies of the economic history of Colombia 
and in particular its coffee industry.  In Conversations with Great Economists, he shifts his 
focus from the application of economic reasoning to its production.  He illuminates the 
contributions of some of the greatest figures in the field and through deft probing elicits the 
philosophical underpinnings and habits of mind that shaped their work.   
 
In his interviews, Dr. Pizano finds them repeatedly alluding to the academic impact of “real 
world” events.  Several, and especially Samuelson, alludes to the Great Depression.  Hayek 
and Kantorovich participate in the great debate between planning and the market that 
marked the Cold War.  Robinson, Kaldor and Tinbergen are profoundly moved by the 
realities of the developing world.  The theoretical work of each was animated by the 
realities around them. 
 
Against this background, it is useful to conjecture how the work of contemporary 
economists may be shaped by the recent economic crisis.  Discussions with colleagues 
draw attention to three lines of innovation.  One is the explicit treatment of the role of 
expectations in the formation of prices.  A second is a greater appreciation of the macro-
level significance of micro-level incentives, especially in capital markets.  A third is a 
greater appreciation of the role of politics. 
 
This Time it is Different 
 
Students of macro-economics and trade tend to be dismissive of those surprised by the 
crisis of 2008.  As documented by (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), such crises have recurred 
throughout the history of modern capitalism.  They arise when demand rapidly expands in a 
major economy, as consumers and governments increase the level of consumption and 
investors acquire and transform assets.  This expansion, they argue, then ramifies, coursing 
through commodity and financial markets.  The result is a global expansion of debt.   
Should adjustments in financial and currency markets be deferred, the result is a later, 
greater, and more costly adjustment, i.e. a crisis.  In their recent book, Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009) record numerous instances of such phenomena. 
 
Despite the regularity with which they occur, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note, each 
collapse is greeted with surprise.  Each time, investors and governments appear convinced 
that “this time it is different”. Not only that, Reinhart and Rogoff record, individuals, 
institutions and governments “serially default.”  The recurring nature of these crises and the 
repeated incidence of default suggest a failure to learn and the holding of beliefs that are 
irrational.  
 
In an era when economic beliefs are held to be rational and in a profession is which models 





The great recession also reminds us of the importance of incorporating into macro-models 
something has long been recognized but too long ignored: that capital markets are 
inherently imperfect.  One reason is that they are inter-temporal.  They therefore give rise 
in time to (in) consistent behavior.  And high levels of information are required to facilitate 
credit markets, such as information concerning the willingness and ability of borrowers to 
complete transactions.  Because of these characteristics, capital markets are often lodged 
within non-market institutions: both lenders and borrowers benefit when that is so.  In the 
words of (Elster 1979), borrowers, like Ulysses, are willing to be coerced: they do better 
“tying themselves to the mast,” thereby rendering themselves unable to succumb to the 
temptations of non-repayment.  By doing so, agents can increase the volume and reduce the 
costs of borrowing.  And, as recognized by Akerloff (1984), those who are better then 
average credit risks may voluntarily render their assets vulnerable to seizure; by pledging 
collateral and posting bonds, they can credibly signaling their intention to repay.   
 
Being inter-temporal, moreover, capital markets are laden not only with the risk of non-
performance but also with risks arising from stochastic behavior and unforeseeable 
contingencies.  One result is economies of scale, as firms seek the benefits to be derived 
from the law of large numbers.  Another is high costs of entry, as firms that survive 
multiple shocks acquire enhanced reputations and therefore lower costs of borrowing.   
 
These same factors – the inter-temporal nature of exchange and imperfect information – re-
introduce the role expectations.  Characteristically, when choices are based upon 
expectations, multiple equilibria exist (Schelling 1960).  As a result, both booms and busts 
become possible.  Attempts to comprehend “contagion,” “fads,” and other forms of 
collective behavior typically focus on the relationship between well-informed and poorly 
informed agents and the manner in which the choices of the first influence the beliefs of the 
second (Akerloff 1984; Kuran 1995; Schleifer and Vishny 1997), and their behavior.  
 
For several important and well-known reasons, then, capital markets are imperfect.  A clear 
lesson of the recent financial shock is that these insights should influence the manner in 
which adjustments are depicted in models of the macro-economy.  Insofar as they do so, we 
– and those who govern us – are less likely to be surprised by financial markets 
Firms and Industry 
 
Not only do recent events suggest that knowledge of capital markets should influence 
models of the macro-economy.  They also suggest that micro-level data – data about 
incentives that prevail within firms and industries – should also influence our models. .
1 
 
Innovations in product markets led to changes in the behavior of firms in capital markets.  
In the banking industry, securitization transformed large and illiquid assets into divisible 
and highly liquid securities: mortgage contracts were bundled, tranched, and sold.  As a 
                                                            
1  Biais, B., T. Mariotti, et al. (2009). Large Risks, Limited Liability and Dynamic Moral Hazard. Toulouse, 
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ/CNRS, IDEI). Represents an  important attempt to design 
contracts to counter excessive preferences for risk.  
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result, bankers began to behave as traders; and the caution once engendered by having to 
borrow short term while lending long term dissipated.  The creation of new ways of 
hedging risks in securities markets and insuring against counter-party default also led to a 
downward revision in the assessment of risk.  When high levels of leverage were employed 
by traders, the result was a massive explosion of debt – underwritten by a slow changing 
quantity of assets in the real economy. 
 
Beginning in roughly 2005, Goldman Sachs began to insure themselves against defaults on 
mortgage-backed securities (Morrgenson and Story 2009).  Goldman-Sachs would certainly 
have been regarded as well informed.  By Bayes Law, however, when people are certain – 
i.e. when their beliefs approach 0 or 1 – new information can engender but small revisions 
in beliefs; and perhaps for that reason, the firms’ had little impact on the expectations of 
others.  When, shortly thereafter, large-scale firms failed, expectations began to alter.  As 
traders sought to fulfill their contracts, many sought to unwind leveraged contracts; and 
following the logic of Schleifer and Vishny (1997), the crisis began to alter from one of 
liquidity to one of solvency.  Asset prices fell at rates that meant that debts could not be 
repaid without further borrowing.  But because the solvency of other institutions could not 
be appraised accurately, banks were reluctant to lend; they hoarded capital in efforts to self-
insure.  The result was a massive and precipitate, rather than smooth and gradual, 
adjustment in capital markets – and a sharp contraction of the macro-economy. 
 
The “story” of the crisis which is well known (Brunnermeier 2009)) once again highlights 
the importance of belief formation in environments of uncertainty.  It highlights the 
importance of incentives at the firm and industry level.  It highlights how rational behavior 
at the micro-level can generate irrational outcomes for society.  The logic communicated by 




The increase in consumption and the decline in savings that elicited the rapid expansion of 
debt originated in the public as well as the private sector.  The recession of the 1970s had 
followed the rapid expansion of the late 1960s, triggered by President Johnson’s 
determination to fight two wars: one at home against poverty and another abroad against 
North Vietnam.  The tax cuts of George W. Bush’s administration resulted in a comparable 
expansion of public debt.  Instructively, both presidents had presided over one-party 
regimes, Johnson for both terms and Bush for the first six years of his presidency.  In both 
instances, then, the checks built into the United States’ government were disabled.  Eras of 
financial profligacy corresponded to eras of single party rule. 
 
The structure of interest groups also played a major role in the crisis (Johnson 2009).  The 
financial industry is characterized by large economies of scale and therefore high degrees 
of concentration.  And if only because of its role in intermediation and settlements, its reach 
extends from Wall Street to Main Street.   One result is that political threats, issued by 
Congress or the Executive branch, have become incredible; the firms are too big to fail.  
Another is that their executives can credibly believe that they can reap the rewards of risky 




The flood of funds unleashed by the politically unconstrained governments therefore 
finances wagers of firms whose executives no longer needed to act prudentially.  The last 
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IV. Remarks by Professor Darrell Hueth 
 
Before presenting my formal remarks I would simply like to express my great happiness 
that this book (Pizano 2009) is now available to my English speaking colleagues.  I recall 
how excited I was when Professor Pizano first gave me a copy of this book in Spanish in 
1993, as I recall.  After looking at the names of the economists interviewed on the cover I 
could hardly wait to get my English/Spanish dictionary and begin reading.  Reading this 
book was a pleasure that exceeded my expectations and also gave me great respect for 
Professor Pizano as a scholar.  The framing of the questions in this book and its publication 
reflect qualities I have observed in many Colombian economists.  First, as with other 
Colombian economists, Diego amply exhibits great intellectual curiosity and a deep 
understanding of the discipline of economics.  Second, the great audacity he had to think 
that as an unknown and very young man he could obtain interviews with this group of 
giants was remarkable.  It reminds me of his father and Mario Laserna who as young men 
thought they could found a first rate University in Colombia and then had the audacity to 
ask Professors Einstein and Von Neumann for their help (which in the end they received!).  
And finally, he had the capability to pull it off, first in Spanish and now in English.   
Felicitaciones Estimado Diego. 
 
Now my formal remarks: 
 
When Diego first asked me to say a few words at this event, I was initially inclined to 
decline the invitation because he suggested that I discuss the relevance of the focus of this 
wonderful book on Keynesian economics in light of the present economic environment.  I 
hesitated.  My hesitation was because I am an Agricultural and Resource Economist and 
macroeconomics is not a major focus in this field of study.  Indeed, most agricultural 
economists regard macroeconomics as being more closely related to witchcraft than to a 
scientific field of study.   However, I then remembered where we are, Washington DC, and 
that competence and knowledge in a field is not a necessary condition to expound at great 
length on any subject in any forum in this town. So, I was a bit more comfortable.   
Moreover, Diego also gave me the liberty to discuss other contributions of these giants of 
economic thought and several of them have also made seminal contributions to a field I can 
claim some competence in, that of Applied Welfare Economics, that is, the theoretical 
foundations for all of what is commonly known as benefit cost analysis.   
 
More specifically, these economists have investigated in detail the conditions under which 
the use of the triangular area above the price line and below the demand curve for a good 
can be used as a measure of welfare for a consumer, and under which changes in this area 
measure the benefits or costs to a consumer resulting from a policy or project which either 
changes price or shift the demand curve.  This metric, originally proposed by the French  
19 
 
engineer Dupuit (1844), and formalized by the great English economist Alfred Marshall 
(1930), has been one of the most controversial in the history of economics.  In addition, 
several of these economists have contributed to the development of an aggregative criterion 
by which we can say whether society as a group is better off when the gains and losses 
using these surplus measures are added up over gainers and losers.  
 
Let me start with the concept of individual consumer’s surplus.   Although he was not 
alone, Professor Samuelson was the perhaps the most influential critic of this concept as a 
useful measure of welfare.  Indeed in his doctoral dissertation (later published as the 
Foundations of Economic Analysis (1941)), he stated that in his ideal book on principles of 
economics, consumer’s surplus would not appear in the chapter on welfare economics 
except perhaps as a footnote.  More importantly, in a classical 1942 paper he demonstrated 
that one of the key assumptions commonly employed by economists to justify its use, 
namely the constancy of the marginal utility of income, implied consumer behavior rarely 
encountered in the real world.   
 
Thus, in spite of several valiant attempts by Sir John Hicks (Hicks 1940-41, 1943, 1956) to 
rehabilitate the concept
2, for some 40 years consumer surplus was largely absent from the 
mainstream journals of what are now called the salt-water universities. If the concept was 
used at all in the mainstream economic journals, it was immediately followed by a 
statement generally apologetic for its use. 
 
The second closely related concept of applied welfare economics which came under 
scrutiny, the Compensation Principle, originally proposed by Nicolas Kaldor (1939) and Sir 
John Hicks (1939) (although it should be mentioned that Harold Hoteling suggested it 
earlier in his 1938 Railway Rates paper) has been just as controversial.  Simply stated, this 
Kaldor/Hicks Principle or Criterion states that if the gainers are willing to pay more for the 
gain than the losers are willing to accept for the loss there is at least a “potential” economic 
gain to be had from the policy or project. One person could potentially be made better off 
with no one else being made worse off.  The criterion was attacked on several grounds.   
 
First, the principle was dependent on the initial distribution of income.  Second, 
compensation was seldom if ever paid and hence this criterion was consistent with making 
the poor poorer and the rich richer as long as the gains to the rich exceeded the losses to the 
                                                            
2  And this was in spite of Professor Hick’s demonstration in his wonderful little 1956 book, A Revision of 
Demand, that if one focused on what is now the called the Hicksian demand curve, along which utility is 
constant, rather than the Marshallian demand curve, along which income is constant, and if one accepted that 
the consumer’s willingness to pay for a change is a reasonable monetary measure of welfare change to the 
consumer, then indeed the change in the consumer surplus area also could be regarded as a monetary measure 




poor. Further, more technically and most importantly Professor Scitovsky (1941) showed 
that if compensation was not paid, a policy suggesting a gain, if adopted, could then be 
reversed and generate a gain anew!  This criticism, called the reversal paradox, was not an 
argument over values, like the income distribution issues, but one of serious theoretical 
challenge.  Hence several modifications to this criterion were suggested.  Samuelson 
suggested a more general criterion to include consideration all possible redistributions of 
income before and after the change.  Little agreed with Scitovsky that a policy should not 
present potentials reversals and the resulting income distribution must be “acceptable.”     
But the Samuelson Criterion (Samuelson 1950) was so difficult to apply it was never 
widely adopted and “acceptable” was so subjective, the Little criterion was also not widely 
applied.       
 
So how did the practitioners of applied welfare economics and benefit cost analysis respond 
to these theoretical challenges?  Did agricultural economists, environmental economists, 
and project evaluation folks at the World Bank abandon the use of consumer surplus and 
the Compensation Principle?  As John Krutilla, who spent most of his professional life 
working a few blocks from here at Resources for the Future, put it in his 1981 Presidential 
Address to the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists: “ …did we 
observe – as we might expect – hesitancy in using welfare economics in the applied area? 
Quite the contrary.  Applied Welfare Economics flourished throughout this period as 
though (if not actually) innocent of the controversy over its theoretical underpinnings.”  
Indeed, the Flood Control Act of 1936 said that benefits and costs must be added 
“independently of to whomsoever they may accrue.”  Thus, there was a legal requirement 
that the Kaldor/Hicks Compensation principle be satisfied for a project to be approved.  
Moreover, the Water Resources Council later in the famous “Green Book” required the use 
of consumer surplus changes as a measure of welfare change for consumers when projects 
were sufficiently large to result in price changes.   
 
Most importantly, particularly for the Salt Water Economists, Robert Willig in 1976 
published a path breaking paper in the American Economic Review entitled “Consumer 
Surplus Without Apology.”   This paper, which explicitly accepted the willingness to pay 
measures of Professor Hicks, namely Compensating and Equivalent Variation, as measures 
of welfare for the consumer, showed that one could use consumer surplus calculated from 
the Marshallian demand curve as a very good approximation to the true consumer surplus 
calculated from the Hicksian demand curve for almost all goods of interest.  Moreover, 
Professor Hausman, in 1981, has shown, using Duality Theory, that for some cases it is not 
necessary to approximate the willingness to pay measures of Professor Hicks.  That is, it is 
possible to exactly measure Hicksian consumer surplus from the econometric estimation of 
the Marshallian demand curve.  Thus, today, we find the MIT, Harvard, Berkeley and  
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Stanford types using this concept without apology as the applied folks and the Chicago 
group has always done. 
 
The Compensation criterion is still a bit controversial.  In our book (Just, Hueth and 
Schmitz (2004)) we show that reversals cannot occur if compensation is paid and that 
likewise reversals cannot arise if one policy results in the elimination of a distortion 
completely.  It is also implied but not shown explicitly that reversals are unlikely to occur 
for goods that are like those which satisfy the Willig condition, that is, those which have 
small income effects or are a small amount of the consumer’s budget.  That is, it is not 
widely recognized that the same conditions that make consumer’s surplus a good 
approximation to the willingness to pay measures, also make it highly unlikely a reversal 
can occur. Thus, applied welfare economics as envisioned by Professors Hicks and Kaldor 
is alive and well in the new millennium in spite of many theoretical challenges it has faced.  
I like to say Pythagorean economics survives. 
 
Let me close with one comment on macroeconomics.   
 
Of all the insightful questions Professor Pizano asked, the question and response I found 
most interesting was the one he asked Professor Hicks: “With reference to this question 
about the future, would you agree with Keynes when he pointed out that the long run is for 
undergraduates and in the long run we are all dead?”  And Professor Hicks responded: “I 
must say that was a very dangerous and irresponsible remark.”   
 
I had long known that Professor Hayek was highly critical of the focus of Professor Keynes 
on the short run, but I had not been previously aware that Professor Hicks shared this view.  
It seems both were greatly concerned about the mischief that could be done by adopting 
short run stimulative measures that would prove to be long run disasters.  Indeed it appears 
to me that Professor Keynes was not sufficiently concerned about efficiency in public 
investment.  I could be wrong about this, and if I am I am sure Professor Pizano can correct 
me, but it seems to me Keynes would be indifferent to stimulating consumer demand by 
building pyramids in the Arizona desert, versus rebuilding bridges and modernization of 
JFK, as long as the expenditure levels were the same.  That is, I have found very little in the 
work of Keynes to suggest that a portfolio of projects should be selected that maximizes the 
social rate of return for a given stimulus program.   
 
As we all know, there has been a great deal of critical analysis of the first Obama stimulus 
program from the standpoint of the number of jobs created.  In some cases it has been 
found that the Administration has claimed jobs created in Congressional Districts which do 
not exist.  The administration seems to be reacting to this criticism.  In a speech last week 
in this institution, President Obama indicated that a second stimulus will focus on job  
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creation.  But really, where are his economic advisors one this issue? Should maximizing 
jobs be the objective?  Perhaps they should from a political standpoint but are jobs what 
should be counted from an economic welfare standpoint?  Are for example 10 McDonalds 
jobs at $20,000 more economically justifiable than 4 lineman jobs at $80,000 a year 
rebuilding our power grid?    
 
I think it is quite unfortunate that Professor Keynes did not give more attention to the 
allocative efficiency of resource use in the implementation of the fiscal measures he 
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V. Remarks by Mauricio Carrizosa 
 
This book by my old college classmate, Diego Pizano, presents conversations that he held 
about thirty years ago with eminent economists that were active at the time. Its preparation 
benefited from the author's deep familiarity with the writings of these economists and from 
an intelligent selection of issues that he discussed with them. Dr. Pizano's book also 
deserves credit for the clarity and readability of a subject matter that is at times complex, 
albeit always considerably interesting. With these ingredients, the reader will readily 
appreciate a set of economic controversies of the time, important both because of the 
academic interest they elicited as well as for their application to issues that were in fact not 
too different from those we face today.  
 
The economists covered by the book span the widest ideological gamut, ranging from the 
free market extreme represented by Professor Hayek, to Professor Robinson's 
Keynesianism, and to Professor Kantarovich's economic planning. The author exploits this 
wide range of views to elicit responses from these economists to issues of interest that mark 
the book's thematic unity. By way of example, I point to three of those issues that should be 
of interest to readers. One relates to the methods that these economists used to develop their 
arguments, an issue that straddles the threshold between economics and philosophy and in 
which the book displays the author's deep interest and knowledge. The discussion 
highlights Hayek's support for an approach akin to the philosophy of Karl Popper, who 
argued that scientific theories, by their abstract nature, can be verified only by probing into 
their observable implications (the "pattern of a process", in Hayek's formulation). This 
contrasts with the more Kantian approach that emerges in the conversations with Professor 
Robinson, with economic phenomena being approached from the broader perspectives of 
metaphysics, morals and science; or with the "a priori truths" of Lionnel Robbins and 
Ludwig Von Mises that Samuelson, in turn, rejects in his chapter and in favor of an 
inductive approach. Throughout these discussions, the author also raises the difficult issue 
of whether mathematics is as potent a tool as words for developing economic arguments, 
with the discussion with Samuelson being of considerable interest in this regard. 
 
The second example refers to the ubiquitous debate between free-market advocates and 
those that support planning and state intervention. It is particularly interesting that the 
pendulum of public opinion between the two continues to this day as each of the two 
approaches shows its positive and adverse manifestations. We have Hayek arguing for the 
conservative vision of a state that provides an appropriate legal framework for the 
functioning of the market (e.g. to keep inflation at bay); taxes at flat rates in order to 
provide those goods that the market cannot supply adequately; and provides goods and 
services to those earning less than a certain minimum. Advocating the latter objective is 
surprising for an author that claims that “the concept of social justice makes sense only in a 
centrally planned economy”, a claim that is something of a shock today, when governments 
increasingly collect taxes, reputedly to achieve greater "social" justice through public 
spending. And at the central planning extreme, the chapter covering Kantarovich is an 
interesting testimonial of optimism on the merits of planning ten years prior to the  
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disintegration of the Soviet Union. In-between, Kaldor argues for governments intervening 
in those situations where intervention can better deal with uncertainty. 
A third example touches on how to model economic cycles. I found Hayek’s interpretation 
most akin to the discussion today. He predicted the 1929 US crash and reasoned that the 
efforts to prolong the boom that threatened to cease in 1927 originated the bust that 
followed, the latter exacerbated as he admits by the deflationary policy that followed. The 
discussion today highlights precisely the excessive liquidity that preceded the deep 
recession that started in 2008, now followed by even more liquidity to help economic 
recovery but that may lead anew to recession (the so-called w-shaped recovery). I found 
Hicks’s take less tractable. He argues in the book that depressions are caused by a variety 
of different shocks (for example invention, public investment, non-linearities between 
investment and growth, and growth itself when below capacity). Isolating those forces may 
be  far  more  complex  than  relying  on the liquidity-based explanations used by Hayek  
then and by Friedman and Schwartz later.  
 
The examples above illustrate the depth and ample thematic content of a book that also 
discusses several other issues such as economic development and long term economic 
growth and capital accumulation. The care that Dr. Pizano afforded to the preparation of 
these discussions and the clarity in their presentation made it a pleasure to read and enjoy 
again this book in its second edition. 
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